ON A REALPOLITIK REFRESHER

THE LONG VIEW

This interview by David Rivkin Jr. with Henry Kissinger in the weekend edition of the Wall Street Journal is worth reading, regardless of one's view of the man or one's party affiliation.  Here are some quotes that resonate most with me:

"Whoever the next president is, the new administration will be extremely disappointed if it believes that our relationships will mend because its leader has a different name . . . . Personal diplomacy and relationship-building, although important, are rarely the paramount drivers of global affairs. These are shaped importantly by the long-term national interest..."

"The "tradition of long-serving senior politicians from both parties who were devoted to a truly national service has passed, or largely so." The entire system, especially as it has been transformed by the communications revolution, "is now much more driven by short-term political calculations, the need to keep powerful and vocal constituencies happy, and an eye on the next election." This effect, Mr. Kissinger posited, has been enhanced by the 24-hour news cycle -- "more information, and less content..."

"An American strategy of benign neglect may, in any case, no longer be realistic in an age of increasing global integration when relatively small transnational networks or failed states can project power against democratic societies with devastating consequences..."

"Meanwhile, most of today's international actors, "including states, international organizations, and nongovernmental actors, are disenchanted with different aspects of the existing world order." Unfortunately, Mr. Kissinger noted, few of these actors are willing to play a constructive long-term role, preferring merely to challenge American policies when they involve risks."

Here's one that rings true, not just in the context of our current President's policies:

"...Mr. Kissinger noted, it is important to recall that the American Republic was not originally designed to sustain an ability to pursue a complex foreign policy. The Framers tended to assume that, once independent, the U.S. could operate reasonably well in relative isolation. These attitudes persist. As a result, Mr. Kissinger posits, Americans have little patience "for a long time of foreign tension."

Because of this, "presidents tend to present difficult cases, particularly those involving military engagements, to the American people in terms of a finite timeline. As a result, they often end up implying, or promising, achievements that may not be possible in the short term -- and that are by no means guaranteed over the long term."

Foreign policy, he emphasized, "is not something easily put on the clock." It must "not oscillate wildly between excesses of commitment and excesses of withdrawal."

This next one is the understatement of the 21st century, on a key part of the U.N.:

"The Security Council," he insisted, "must be reformed, since -- at the present time -- it does not represent the realities of the international community because major countries like India, Japan, Germany and Brazil are not included."

And finally, there's this view on the evolution of global political systems:

"He also emphasized some profound changes in today's geopolitical environment. He pointed out that the world we have known for 300 years now -- the "Westphalian" international system that arose after Europe's wars of religion and is based on the nation-state -- is "collapsing."

This may be a much more profound shift than the move from dynastic to national motivations following the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna (about which Mr. Kissinger has written) and a more serious challenge to international stability than that posed by states such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.

The nation-state is weakening in Europe, he observed, and has met with mixed success in other parts of the world. "Only in Russia, the United States and Asia can it be found in its classic form."

Meanwhile, across the Middle East and southern Asia, although nationalism remains a powerful force, many cast themselves as a part of a greater Islamic community defined in opposition to the West. In Mr. Kissinger's view, a single formula will no longer adequately describe this international system."

At 84 years old, Henry Kissinger is still going strong in this new century.

Comments

[Brian Hayes]

Kissinger is no fool. But I warn that he's matured in our world, he's watched what we see, he's built where we now survive, and he's learned to use what we know. Rhetoric is his tool and Game Theory is in his back pocket.

We tease Bush and the billions he spends to promote himself as a branch of the Constitution while we fail to examine the tree. We are the trillions distributed around the world. It is our value that is at stake these days. We are a labor of generations that the "tradition of long-serving senior politicians from both parties" have denied and betrayed.

I don't mean this in the mountain man sense of scorn nor the prairie sense of exclusion, but I mean to say that Henry has wrapped a whip in every phrase, as pandering as he is always, and the better truth that keeps us free of his wit is that we remain unhappy with what he gave us.

I think it's important to study each turn of Henry's moment. There's no gift in it.

[Alex Tolley]

These two items stuck out for me:

1. Mr. Kissinger agreed with the point that other nations will have to have scope to develop their own identities. But he pointed out that to have world order, "these identities need to be reconciled into some general consensus." An American strategy of benign neglect may, in any case, no longer be realistic in an age of increasing global integration when relatively small transnational networks or failed states can project power against democratic societies with devastating consequences.

2. The nation-state is weakening in Europe, he observed, and has met with mixed success in other parts of the world. "Only in Russia, the United States and Asia can it be found in its classic form."

The former indicates a world view that required ORDER - that there must be an acceptable (to the US?) consensus on how states and other actors must behave. Given the inevitable rise of technologies of mass destruction, this could result in an ever more authoritarian approach to global governance. I don't believe that is either desirable or possible.

The latter comment is more interesting, in that it ironically suggests that the US is behind the times, maintaining a nationalism simply because it needs to in order to project power. If that power fails for any reason, then the US might join Europe is downplaying nationalist tendencies.

It will be interesting to see how some of this plays out - clearly the US is undergoing imperial overstretch today - and might quickly follow Britain as a declining world power. But will a new dominant nation state take over, perhaps China, or will the world move to less nationalistic politics more global belief systems, when religious or otherwise?